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Abstract
We consider piecewise linear discrete time macroeconomic models, which possess
a continuum of equilibrium states. These systems are obtained by replacing rational
inflation expectations with a boundedly rational, and genuinely sticky, response of
agents to changes in the actual inflation rate in a standard Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model. Both for a low-dimensional variant of the model, with
one representative agent, and the multi-agent model, we show that, when exogenous
noise is absent from the system, the continuum of equilibrium states is the global
attractor. Further, when a uniformly bounded noise is present, or the equilibrium
states are destabilized by an imperfect Central Bank policy (or both), we estimate
the size of the domain that attracts all the trajectories. The proofs are based on
introducing a family of Lyapunov functions and, for the multi-agent model, deriving
a formula for the inverse of the Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator acting in the space of
discrete time inputs and outputs.
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1 Introduction
Notions of friction and stickiness are widely accepted to exist in organizations, economies,
and financial systems. Drawing intuition from mathematical physics, one can propose that
a system with (dry) friction should have a continuum of equilibrium states. For example,
an object can achieve an equilibrium on a curved surface at any point where the slope
does not exceed the dry friction coefficient because friction balances the gravity. Notably,
various hard-to-explain empirical regularities found in micro, macro, and organizational
economic data, such as path-dependence, permanence, hysteresis, boom blessings and
recession curses can be accounted for by the presence of many meta-stable states with the
associated long timescale dynamics, which frictions introduce into an economic system.
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In other words, frictional effects at the micro-level might aggregate to macro-level long
term memory effects.
Based on this premise, we propose to test how the introduction of internal frictions
affects dynamics of well-established single equilibrium economic models. It is a fundamen-
tal question what forms of friction actually arise from the behavior of economic agents,
and how these can be modeled. In this paper, we take a phenomenological approach to
modeling frictions using play operators, which are common in physics and engineering
applications. In the context of economics, they are associated with the notions of ‘thresh-
old’ and ‘inaction band’. These operators have been described in several equivalent ways
including piecewise linear (PWL) functions and variational inequalities. We proceed by
positing that inflation and inflation expectation are related by the play operator (or a
combination thereof in the multi-agent variant of the model) in a version of a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) macroeconomic model. Our analysis focuses on
one particular feature of the adapted model with frictions. Namely, we consider local and
global stability of this discrete time PWL system, which naturally possesses a continuum
of equilibrium states.
In the remainder of this section some economic background and the structure of the
paper are briefly discussed.
Economic background and motivation. Seminal work by the likes of Walras and
Jevons in the late 1800’s steered the field of economics away from the domain of philosophy,
and laid foundations for it to develop into a mathematically tractable, exact science.
Early pioneers of what became known as Neoclassical Economics saw parallels between
economic systems and the equilibrating forces in nature, and thus borrowed heavily from
mathematical physics to derive both intuition and methodologies [1]. Despite concerns
about the simplifying assumptions needed for this taˆtonnement-driven view (e.g. [2, 3]),
the single-equilibrium approach is still considered good enough in many settings, and has
not been supplanted by any widely-accepted, complete system. Significant developments
have come from introducing concepts like Rational Expectations and Sticky Models. The
former is the assumption of aggregate consistency in dynamic models [4]. This view admits
that agent’s expectations about future uncertainties may be wrong individually, but in
aggregate are in agreement with the model itself. In other words, although the future is
not fully predictable, agents’ expectations are assumed not to be systematically biased
and collectively use all relevant information in forming expectations of economic variables.
Meanwhile the later includes the widely-used sticky models of Calvo [5] and the sticky-
information of Mankiw and Reis [6]. These models are concerned with similar observations
about the way in which real life agents do not instantaneously move to the ‘correct’ price
or opinion but rather do so at a fixed rate and can be represented mathematically by
introducing a delay term into the relevant equations. In the absence of noise the same
optimal equilibrium solution will be reached as if the stickiness were absent. Continua
of possible equilibria can also occur in such models (see for example [7, 8]) but only in
certain special cases (such as a passive interest-rate policy [5, 9]) and are considered an
extreme form of indeterminacy.
However, a robust empirical feature of economic output for developed countries is that
output and output growth are non-normally distributed, exhibiting fat tails and excess
kurtosis. In many models such booms and busts are explained by the occurrence of large
(unpredictable) exogenous shocks followed by tranquil periods when nothing leads to non-
normality. Explaining such regularities within linear unique-equilibrium economic models
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often involves adding a posteriori assumptions such as the existence of an eigenvalue with
largest modulus close to, but inside, the unit circle (the Unit Root Hypothesis). A better
model should generate non-normality of the output data from within the theory.
The critique of unique-equilibrium models has a long history which we shall not at-
tempt to detail here. For example, many have eloquently pointed out fundamental issues
with the assumed equilibrating processes and the ways in which the “aggregation prob-
lem” was being solved (e.g. [10–13]). This approach is taken by multi-agent models
including models of agents’ behavior under imperfect information, cognitive limitations,
or endogenously generated “animal spirits” [14]. Here, the themes of confusion, rational
inattention, simplification, and bounded rationality take center stage (e.g. the work of
Sims and Gabaix). Non-normality in these models can be associated with cascading ef-
fects. Most of these models are however purely numerical, and incorporate assumptions
inspired by the social sciences (e.g. psychology and sociology) in order to add more realis-
tic behavior to the modeling construct of individual actors (much recent work has focused
on the question of whether individual actors can ever be sufficiently rational).
Our approach is complementary to many of the above-referenced views. In this paper,
we argue that a lingering constraint of single-equillibrium in all these models is unneces-
sary. Hysteresis is a well-understood property that explains the “stickiness” observed in
many physical systems (e.g. plasticity, magnetism), and which explains how many equi-
llibria can arise and be stable. Hysteresis has only recently been explicitly considered in
economic time series such as the unemployment rate [15–17]. The form of stickiness that
we use is, to our knowledge, new in a economic setting and differs from, for example, the
stickiness of the Calvo pricing model [5] where hypothetical agents are only allowed to
adjust (to the correct price) at a fixed rate. The way in which we incorporate stickiness
into the model will be justified and described more fully below but, briefly, our sticky
variables can only be in one of two modes. They are either currently ‘stuck’ at some value
or they are being ‘dragged’ along by some other (related) variable because the maximum
allowable difference between them has been reached. Hence, our agents are truly stuck
(not just delayed) until forced to adjust by the discrepancy with the actual inflation rate.
If an equilibrium is reached it is chosen by the prior states of the system, and a continuum
of equilibria is an intrinsic feature of the model.
The research into how expectations are formed is extensive but far from conclusive,
see for example [18–22]. However the idea of threshold effects and a ‘harmless interval’ of
inflation is not new in economics [23–27]. A person may concurrently be subject to many
or all of the limitations (e.g. rational inattention and bounded rationality and confusion,
etc.), but for our purposes it is enough to assume that individual actors behave according
to the play operator we describe, and we can remain relatively agnostic as to which
mechanism may be driving the general features of the play operator (band of inaction,
thresholds). In the absence of any exogenous forcing it would be very easy to distinguish
between Calvo-type stickiness and the stuck-then-dragged behavior we investigate here
— indeed Calvo stickiness would most likely be observed since agents could tell far more
easily over time that, for example, their wage demands were too low and they were losing
purchasing power. However, given the uncertainty of reality and the very limited cognitive
skills or interest in forecasting of most economic agents, that may no longer hold.
Structure of the paper. In the next section, we present a discrete time 3-dimensional
PWL macroeconomic model with sticky inflation expectations modeled by a play oper-
ator. The model uses the notion of a representative agent. When the exogenous noise
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terms are absent from the system, it has a line segment of equilibrium points. Section 3
contains main results. In particular, in the system without exogenous noise, a simple con-
dition ensures that the line segment of equilibrium points is the global attractor (Section
3.1). In the presence of uniformly bounded noise, we obtain an estimate of the globally
attracting domain, which is proportional to the supremum norm of the noise. Interest-
ingly, this estimate is uniform with respect to the parameter that controls the amount of
stickiness in the expectation of future inflation rate. We then consider further variants
of the model. First, we add stickiness into the response of the Central Bank (Section
3.2). This can destabilize the equilibrium states (leading to periodic, quasiperiodic or
more complex dynamics [28] with the associated border collision bifurcations, which are
typical of piecewise smooth systems [29]) but the system still possesses a bounded globally
attracting domain. Then we consider a multi-agent variant of the model (Section 3.3).
This is an (n + 2)-dimensional PWL system with 2n switching surfaces. We show that
the n-dimensional continuum of equilibrium states of this system is the global attractor.
Finally, the proofs based on constructing a family of Lyapunov functions are presented in
Section 4. In order to apply the Lyapunov function to the multi-agent model, we adapt a
technique from the theory of hysteresis operators [30,31]. Namely, an explicit formula for
the inverse of the Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator acting in the space of discrete time inputs
and outputs is derived and used. We conclude with a summary of the main results and
some suggestions for future work.
2 The model
2.1 DSGE modeling framework
The standard approach to the problem of aggregating expectations is to introduce a
‘Representative Agent’ whose expectations are fully-informed and rational and consistent
with the model itself. Here, an aggregation of boundedly rational agents into a similar
Representative is required. Our approach is similar in spirit to that of De Grauwe [14]
but we use a different model of boundedly rational agents’ behavior.
We start from a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) macroeconomics
model, which includes aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations
xt = b1pt + (1− b1)xt−1 + b2yt + ηt,
yt = (1− a1)yt−1 − a2(rt − pt) + t, (1)
augmented with the interest rate-setting Taylor rule
rt = c1xt + c2yt + ξt, (2)
where yt is output gap (or unemployment rate, or another measure of economic activity
such as gross domestic product), xt is inflation rate, rt is interest rate, pt is the economic
agents’ aggregate expectation of future inflation rate, ηt, t, ξt are exogenous noise terms,
and t ∈ N. The parameters satisfy
0 ≤ a1 < 1, 0 < b1 < 1, a2, b2, c1, c2 > 0.
Of specific interest is the case a1 = 0.
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This model is close to the model used in [14] but simpler in that we do not include
the aggregate expectation of the output gap and the correlation between the subsequent
values of the interest rate. The inclusion of such factors does not affect our most significant
qualitative observations, but would complicate some aspects of the rigorous analysis that
we present.1
The novelty of our modeling strategy is in how we define the relationship between the
aggregate expectation of inflation pt and the inflation rate xt.
2.2 Sticky expectation of inflation
We start from the empirical evidence cited above that individual agents’ expectations are
often sticky and may lag behind the currently observable values before they start to move.
We also posit that this gap between future expectations and current reality cannot grow
too large. We then imbue our now boundedly rational Representative Agent with these
same properties. More precisely, we assume the following rules that define the variations
of the expectation of future inflation rate pt with the actual inflation rate xt at integer
times t:
(i) The value of the difference |pt − xt| never exceeds a certain bound ρ;
(ii) As long as the above restriction is satisfied, the expectation does not change, i.e.
|xt − pt−1| ≤ ρ implies pt = pt−1;
(iii) If the expectation has to change, it makes the minimal increment consistent with
constraint (i).
Rule (ii) introduces stickiness in the dependence of pt on xt, while (i) states that
the expected inflation rate cannot deviate from the actual rate more than prescribed
by a threshold value ρ. Hence pt follows xt reasonably closely but on the other hand is
conservative because it remains indifferent to variations of xt limited to a (moving) window
p − ρ ≤ x ≤ p + ρ. The last rule (iii) enforces continuity of the relationship between pt
and xt and, in this sense, can be considered as a technical modeling assumption that is
mathematically convenient.
Rules (i)–(iii) are expressed by the formula
pt = xt + Φρ(pt−1 − xt), t ∈ N (3)
with the piecewise linear saturation function
Φρ(v) =

ρ if v ≥ ρ,
v if −ρ < v < ρ,
−ρ if v ≤ −ρ.
(4)
Equations (1) and (2), completed with formulas (3) and (4), form a closed 3-dimensional
PWL model for the evolution of the aggregated variables xt, yt, pt. Another variant of this
1More complicated variants of DSGE models, employing many more variables to represent different
sectors of the economy, are widely used by central banks to help determine interest rate policy [32–
35]. DYNARE software platform supporting both DSGE models relying on the rational expectations
hypothesis and some models where agents have limited rationality or imperfect knowledge of the state of
the economy is available at [36].
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the play and stop operators with the threshold ρ = 1.
Left: Example of an input-output sequence (xt, pt) of the play operator. For each t, (xt, pt) is
the nearest point to (xt−1, pt−1), which belongs to the band |x − p| ≤ 1 (shown in grey) and
has x = xt. Right: The corresponding input-output sequence (xt, st) = (xt, xt − pt) of the stop
operator satisfies |st| ≤ 1 for all t.
Figure 2: Continuous time mechanical interpretations of the stop operator. Left: The position
x of the center of the frame, which has length 2ρ, is the input; the relative position s of the
center of the frame with respect to the center of the grey box is the output. The frame moves
and drags the box creating the input-output sequence (x, s). Right: Schematic of the Prandtl’s
model of quasi-static elastoplasticity [37]. The grey box is not moving unless the absolute value
of the force s of the ideal spring reaches the maximal value ρ of the Coulomb friction force
between the box and the surface (equivalently, s can denote the elongation of the spring); x is
the coordinate of the end of the spring.
model has been considered in [28]. Iterations of system (1)–(4) start from a set of initial
conditions x0, y0, p0 satisfying |x0 − p0| ≤ ρ.
Some further terminology will be useful. Denote by S the set of all real sequences
x = (x0, x1, . . . ). For a given parameter ρ > 0, the play operator pρ : [−ρ, ρ] × S → S is
defined as the mapping which with a given initial condition s0 ∈ [−ρ, ρ] and a sequence
x ∈ S associates the sequence
p = (p0, p1, . . .) = pρ[s0, x]t ∈ S (5)
according to the formula (3) with p0 = x0−s0 [30]. The parameter ρ is called the threshold,
see Fig. 1 (left). A dual mapping sρ : [−ρ, ρ]×S → S, which is defined by the relationship
st = Φρ(xt − xt−1 + st−1), t ∈ N (6)
for an arbitrary pair (s0, x) ∈ [−ρ, ρ]× S, is known as the stop operator
s = (s0, s1, . . .) = sρ[s0, x]t ∈ S, (7)
see Fig. 1 (right). By definition the play and stop operators sum up to the identity:
pt + st = xt
for the sequences (5), (7).
One can think of the play operator as having two modes, see Fig. 2 (left). A ‘stuck
mode’ where it will not respond to small changes in the input xt and a ‘dragged mode’
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where the absolute difference between the input xt and output pt are at the maximum
allowable and changes to the input, in the correct direction, will drag the output along
with it. Further, in the context of our model, the output of the stop operator st measures
the difference between the inflation rate and the expectation of the future inflation rate,
hence st remains within the bound |st| ≤ ρ at all times. We shall refer to the variable
st = xt − pt as the perception gap. Interestingly the explicit relationship (6) has been
observed in actual economic data [38, 39]. Fig. 2 (right) gives an interpretation of the
stop operator combing an ideal spring and a dry friction element as used in mechanics.
3 Main results
3.1 Autonomous system
We first consider system (1)–(3) without noise terms:
xt = b1pt + (1− b1)xt−1 + b2yt,
yt = (1− a1)yt−1 − a2(c1xt + c2yt − pt),
pt = xt + Φρ(pt−1 − xt).
(8)
Equilibrium points of this system form a line segment
A =
{
(x∗, y∗, p∗)(u) : x∗(u) = κu, y∗(u) =
b1
b2
u, p∗(u) = (κ− 1)u, |u| ≤ ρ
}
(9)
with
κ =
a2(b2 + b1c2) + a1b1
a2b2(1− c1) .
Theorem 3.1. If c1 > 1, then the line segment A of equilibrium points is the global attrac-
tor for system (8). Further, any trajectory converges to an equilibrium point (x∗, y∗, p∗) ∈
A.
We note that system (8) is written in an implicit form. If c1 > 1 as in Theorem 3.1,
it is easy to rewrite this system as an explicit PWL map (xt, yt, pt) = f(xt−1, yt−1, pt−1).
3.2 Sticky Central Bank response
The Central Bank policy can presumably exhibit stickiness too. To explore this scenario
in this section we replace the Taylor rule (2) with the relation
rt = pσ[c1x+ c2y]t + ξt (10)
also involving a play operator with an initial condition r0 such that |r0−(c1x0+c2y0)| ≤ σ.
The play operator pσ with a threshold σ ≥ 0 independent of ρ in (10) should express the
fact that the central bank’s decisions do not immediately follow the instantaneous value
of c1xt + c2yt, but they are activated only if the difference between rt and c1xt + c2yt risks
to exceed a given value σ. For σ = 0, pσ is the identity mapping and (10) becomes (2).
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It is worth noting that for σ > 0 and a sequence {vt}, rt = pσ[v]t is the sequence with
minimal variation in the σ-neighborhood of {vt}, that is, the implication
rˆ0 = r0, |rˆt − vt| ≤ σ ∀t ∈ N ∪ {0} ⇒
T∑
t=1
|rˆt − rˆt−1| ≥
T∑
t=1
|rt − rt−1| (11)
holds for every sequence {rˆt} and any T ∈ N as a special case of [40, Theorem 1.2
and Corollary 1.6]. The meaning of (10) can thus be interpreted as the optimal strategy
allowing to stay in a σ-neighborhood of the input sequence under minimal “cost” incurred
by variations of the interest rate.
Re-writing equation (43) equivalently as
rt = c1xt + c2yt + Φσ(rt−1 − c1xt−1 − c2yt−1) + ξt, (12)
we obtain a 4-dimensional PWL system (1), (3), (12). In the absence of noise, i.e. when
ηt = t = ξt = 0 for all t, this system has the following set of equilibrium points:
M =
{
(x∗, y∗, p∗, r∗) : x∗ = κu+
v
c1 − 1 , y∗ =
b1
b2
u, p∗ = (κ− 1)u+ v
c1 − 1 ,
r∗ =
(
c1κ+
b1c2
b2
)
u+
v
c1 − 1 , |u| ≤ ρ, |v| ≤ σ
}
.
The subset
A0 = {(x∗, y∗, p∗, r∗) ∈M : v = 0} (13)
of M can be considered as a natural embedding of the equilibrium set (9) into the 4-
dimensional phase space of system (1), (3), (12).
It should be pointed out right away that stickiness in the Taylor rule can have a
destabilizing effect on the equilibrium states. To see this, consider for simplicity the case
when ρ = 0, which implies p = x and s = 0, i.e. we remove stickiness in the inflation
expectation. Note that the system is locally linear in a vicinity of every equilibrium point
belonging to M and satisfying |v| < σ. Further, a simple calculation shows that the
determinant of the linearization at such equilibrium points equals (1 − a1)(1 − b1)/(1 −
b1−a2b2). If 1−b1 > a2b2 > a1(1−b1), then this determinant is greater than 1, hence these
equilibria are unstable (in particular, they are unstable in the important case of a1 = 0,
1 − b1 > a2b2). Numerical examples of several attractors including periodic orbits of
different periods, a quasiperiodic orbit or a union of two equilibrium points corresponding
to v = ±σ (end points of the line segment of equilibrium points) can be found in [].
The goal of this section is to estimate how far trajectories can deviate from the equlib-
rium set A0 due to stickiness in the Taylor rule and a uniformly bounded noise.
Theorem 3.2. Let us consider system (1), (3), (12) with uniformly bounded exogenous
terms ηt, t, ξt and with c1 > 1. There exist constants L1, L2, which depend on the param-
eters a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2 but are independent of the threshold ρ of the inflation expectation
(see (3)), such that every trajectory satisfies
lim sup
t→∞
|xt − x∗(st)|, lim sup
t→∞
|yt − y∗(st)| ≤ L1σ + L2m, (14)
where (x∗, y∗, p∗)(·) is defined in (9), st = xt − pt, σ is the threshold of the play operator
in the central bank’s policy (see (10)) and
m = sup
t
max{|t|, |ηt|, |ξt|} <∞. (15)
8
The proof presented below suggests an explicit upper bound for the coefficients L1, L2
in (14). Due to relations p = x− s and (12), estimates (14) imply similar estimates for pt
and rt:
lim sup
t→∞
|pt − p∗(st)| ≤ L1σ + L2m, (16)
lim sup
t→∞
|rt − c1x∗(st)− c2y∗(st)| ≤ (c1 + c2)(L1σ + L2m) + σ +m. (17)
According to Theorem 3.2, estimates (14)–(17) are uniform with respect to ρ. In
particular, if σ = 0 and hence system (1), (3), (12) becomes equivalent to system (1)–(3),
then every trajectory converges to a neigborhood
A(R) =
{
(x, y, p) : min
(x∗,y∗,p∗)∈A
max{|x− x∗|, |y − y∗|, |p− p∗|} ≤ R
}
of the set (9) of equilibrium points, and the size of this neighborhood is proportional to
the supremum norm of the noise terms, R = L2m, and is independent of the threshold ρ
of inflation expectations (cf. Theorem 3.1).
3.3 A multi-agent model
Model (1)–(3) can be easily extended to account for differing types of agent with different
inflation rate expectation thresholds. To this end, we replace the simple relationship (5)
between pt and xt (which is equivalent to (3)) with the equation
pt =
n∑
i=1
νipρi [βi, x]t. (18)
Here the play operator pρi models the expectation of inflation by the i-th agent; pt is the
aggregate expectation of inflation; νi > 0 is a weight measuring the contribution of agent’s
expectation of inflation to the aggregate quantity; ρi is an individual threshold character-
izing the behavior of the i-th agent; βi is the initial condition for the corresponding play
operator; and we assume the ordering 0 < ρ1 < · · · < ρn.
Operator (18) is known as a (discrete) Prandtl-Ishlinskii (PI) operator [30,37,41].2 In
analysis of this operator, it is convenient to restrict the set of initial conditions of the play
operators in (18). In what follows, we assume that |β1| < ρ1 and |βi − βi−1| ≤ ρi − ρi−1
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Further, the coefficients νi are assumed to fulfill the condition
νi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , n , ν0 := 1−
n∑
i=1
νi ≥ 0 . (19)
It will be useful to define the quantity st similarly as in (7), that is
st = xt − pt = ν0xt +
n∑
i=1
νisρi [βi, x]t , (20)
2The continuous time counterpart of this operator is widely used as a friction model in mechanical
applications [42] as well as for modeling elastoplastic systems [43], constitutive laws of smart materials [44],
and material fatigue [45].
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where sρi [βi, x]t = xt − pρi [βi, x]t for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Equations (1), (2), (18) form an (n + 2)-dimensional PWL system. Similarly, if the
Taylor rule (2) is replaced with its sticky counterpart (12), we obtain a PWL system
of dimension n + 3. One can formulate natural analogs of Theorems 3.1, 3.2 for these
systems. For example, let us consider the analog of Theorem 3.1 for the autonomous
system
xt = b1pt + (1− b1)xt−1 + b2yt,
yt = (1− a1)yt−1 − a2(c1xt + c2yt − pt) (21)
coupled with formula (18) for the aggregate expectation of inflation.
Theorem 3.3. If c1 > 1, then any trajectory of system (18), (21) converges to an equi-
librium point of this system.
We note that equilibrium points of system (18), (21) form an n-dimensional paral-
lelepiped in its phase space. The proof of Theorem 3.3 uses the constructions from the
proof of Theorem 3.1 but additionally relies on an inversion formula for the Prandtl-
Ishlinskii operator. This proof also shows a possible way to extend Theorem 3.2 to the
multi-agent model (1), (12), (18) with sticky inflation expectation and exogenous noise.
4 Proofs
4.1 Play and stop operators
For the reader’s convenience, we summarize here some well-known properties of the dis-
crete time stop operator st = sρ[s0, x]t and play operator pt = pρ[s0, x]t which are needed
in the sequel.
Lemma 4.1. Let {xt; t ∈ N∪{0}} be a given sequence. Then pt, st satisfy (5), (7) if and
only if |st| ≤ ρ for all t ∈ N ∪ {0} and the variational inequality
(pt − pt−1, st − z) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ N ∪ {0} (22)
holds for every z ∈ [−ρ, ρ].
Proof. Relations (5), (7) are equivalent to the series of implications
pt − pt−1 > 0 ⇒ pt = xt − ρ ⇒ st = ρ , pt − pt−1 < 0 ⇒ pt = xt + ρ ⇒ st = −ρ ,
which is in turn equivalent to (22) under the condition |st| ≤ ρ for all t ∈ N. 
For a generic sequence {zt; t ∈ N ∪ {0}}, we introduce the notation
∇tz := zt − zt−1 if t ≥ 1; ∇2t z = zt − 2zt−1 + zt−2 if t ≥ 2 . (23)
We will systematically use the identity
∇tz zt = 1
2
(
z2t − z2t−1
)
+
1
2
(∇tz)2. (24)
Choosing in (22) the value z = st−1, we obtain that ∇tp∇ts ≥ 0, hence
∇tx∇ts ≥ (∇ts)2 . (25)
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Furthermore, summing the inequalities
(pt − pt−1)(st − st−1) ≥ 0 ,
(pt−1 − pt−2)(st−1 − st) ≥ 0 ,
which follow from (22) by the choice z = st−1 and z = st, respectively, we obtain that
∇2tp∇ts ≥ 0, hence
∇2tx∇ts ≥ ∇2t s∇ts =
1
2
(
(∇ts)2 − (∇t−1s)2
)
+
1
2
(∇2t s)2 , (26)
and similarly
∇2tx∇tx =
1
2
(
(∇tx)2 − (∇t−1x)2
)
+
1
2
(∇2tx)2 , (27)
which is a special case of identity (24) with zt = ∇ts and zt = ∇tx.
Lemma 4.2. For a given sequence {xt; t ∈ N∪ {0}}, put pt = pρ[s0, x]t, st = xt− pt with
some given initial condition s0 ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. Let qt = xt + δst = (1 + δ)xt − δpt for some
δ > −1. Then
xt =
1
1 + δ
(
qt + δp(1+δ)ρ[(1 + δ)s0, q]t
)
. (28)
Proof. We have qt − pt = (1 + δ)st, hence |qt − pt| ≤ (1 + δ)ρ, and
(pt − pt−1, qt − pt − (1 + δ)ρx) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ N ∀|x| ≤ 1 . (29)
By Lemma 4.1, this implies that pt = p(1+δ)ρ[(1 + δ)s0, q]t and the assertion follows. 
Lemma 4.3. For a given sequence {xt; t ∈ N ∪ {0}}, put pt = pρ[s0, x]t with some given
initial condition s0 ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. Then for every t, j ∈ N we have
|pt+j − pt| ≤ max
i=1,...,j
{|xt+i − xt|} . (30)
Proof. We fix t ∈ N ∪ {0}, J ∈ N and for j = 0, 1, . . . , J set
Sj = max{|pt+j − pt|2, max
i=1,...,J
{|xt+i − xt|2}} .
The proof will be complete if we prove that the sequence {Sj} is nonincreasing for j =
0, 1, . . . , J . Indeed, then SJ ≤ S0, which is precisely the desired statement.
Assume for contradiction that Sj > Sj−1 for some j = 1, . . . , J . Then
|pt+j − pt| > max
i=1,...,J
{|xt+i − xt|} , (31)
(pt+j − pt)2 > (pt+j−1 − pt)2 . (32)
Inequality (32) can be equivalently written as
(pt+j − pt+j−1)(pt+j − pt) > 1
2
(pt+j − pt+j−1)2 > 0 . (33)
We now replace in (22) written for t+ j instead of t the element z by st and obtain
(pt+j − pt+j−1)(st+j − st) ≥ 0 , (34)
hence, combining (33) with (34), we have
(pt+j − pt)(st+j − st) ≥ 0 ,
which implies that
(pt+j − pt)2 ≤ (pt+j − pt)(xt+j − xt)
in contradiction with (31). This completes the proof of Lemma 4.3. 
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4.2 Long time asymptotics
This section is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of system (1), (10) as
t→∞. Put zt = sσ[s0, c1p+c2y]t = c1xt+c2yt−rt+ξt. This allows us, with the notation
(23), to rewrite (1), (10) in the form
(1− a1)∇ty + (a1 + a2c2)yt + a2(c1 − 1)xt + a2st = a2(zt − ξt) + t,
(1− b1)∇tx+ b1st − b2yt = ηt . (35)
As a consequence of (35), we have
(1− b1)∇2tx+ b1∇ts− b2∇ty = ∇tη
with the notation (23). This enables us to eliminate yt from the system (35) and refor-
mulate it as a second order equation
∇2tx+ A∇tx+B∇ts+ Cxt +Dst = ht , t ≥ 2, (36)
with positive constants
A =
a1 + a2c2
1− a1 , B =
b1
1− b1 , C =
a2b2(c1 − 1)
(1− a1)(1− b1) , D =
b1(a1 + a2c2) + a2b2
(1− a1)(1− b1) , (37)
and with the right-hand side
ht =
1
(1− a1)(1− b1)
(
(1− a1)∇tη + b2(a2(zt − ξt) + t) + (a1 + a2c2)ηt
)
. (38)
The sequence {ht} contains the term zt which is bounded above by σ, and the noise terms
t, ξt, ηt, and ∇tη.
Equation (36) always has a solution xt at each time step t, since the right-hand side
of (36) is for each fixed t a bounded function of xt and the left hand side is an increasing
piecewise linear function of xt. In some cases, the solution may not be unique if the
coefficient D∗ := a2b2/((1 − a1)(1 − b1)) in front of xt on the right-hand side is large.
Our computations below show, however, that all solutions have the same asymptotic
convergence towards a small neighborhood of a particular equilibrium point depending
on the trajectory.
4.2.1 Auxiliary estimate 1
We put
qt := Cxt +Dst , (39)
and multiply the equation (36) by ∇tq = C∇tx+D∇ts. Putting
V 1t :=
1
2
(
C(∇tx)2 +D(∇ts)2 + q2t
)
(40)
and using the relations (24)–(25) we obtain that
V 1t −V 1t−1+
C
2
(∇2tx)2+
D
2
(∇2t s)2+AC(∇tx)2+(BC+AD+BD)(∇ts)2+
1
2
(∇tq)2 ≤ ht∇tq .
(41)
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4.2.2 Auxiliary estimate 2
We now rewrite (36) in the form
∇2tx+
A
C
∇tq +
(
B − AD
C
)
∇ts+ qt = ht (42)
with qt given by (39), and multiply it by qt. We use (24) again and find constants E,F > 0
depending on A,B,C,D such that
∇tx qt−∇t−1x qt−1 + A
2C
(q2t−q2t−1) +
1
2
q2t ≤ (∇tx−∇2tx)∇tq + E(∇ts)2 −
A
2C
(∇tq)2 + htqt
≤ F
(
1
2
(∇2tx)2 + A(∇tx)2
)
+ ht qt . (43)
We now set
V 0t := ∇tx qt +
A
2C
q2t , (44)
so that (43) has the form
V 0t − V 0t−1 +
1
2
q2t ≤ F
(
1
2
(∇2tx)2 + A(∇tx)2
)
+ ht qt . (45)
Finally, we choose λ > 0 such that λF < C, and λV 0t ≥ −12V 1t for all t ∈ N, and put
Wt = V
1
t + λV
0
t . Then, due to (41) and (45), there exists a constant µ > 0 such that
Wt −Wt−1 + µWt ≤ L|ht|
√
Wt (46)
for all t ∈ N as a consequence of (40), (41), and (45), with some constant L > 0.
4.2.3 Asymptotic behavior: Proof of Theorems 3.1–3.2
Let c1 > 1. If ht = 0, that is, no noise is present and the reaction of the central bank is
instantaneous with σ = 0, then Wt is a Lyapunov function of the system which decays
exponentially to 0. In particular, qt defined by (39) converge exponentially to q∞ = 0.
Then, it follows from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 that xt converge to some value x∞, hence
st = sρ[s0, x]t converge to some s∞ such that
Cx∞ +Ds∞ = 0, (47)
and pt = xt − st → x∞ − s∞. Further, equations (8) imply that yt → y∞ and the point
(x∞, y∞, p∞) belongs to the set (9). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
In the case of a general right-hand side ht, we have for every t > T > 0 as a consequence
of (46) that
Wt ≤ (1 + µ)−TWt−T + L
t∑
j=t−T+1
|hj|
√
Wj(1 + µ)
j−1−t . (48)
Assume that there exists T > 0 such that for all t0 ∈ N we have
1
T
t0+T∑
t=t0+1
|hj| ≤ σˆ . (49)
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Then it follows from (48) that
Wt ≤ (1 + µ)−TWt−T + LT σˆ
1 + µ
max
j=t−T+1,...,t
√
Wj (50)
for all t > T . Assume first that there exists t > T such thatWt ≥ Wj for all j = t−T, . . . , t.
Then (50) yields that
Wt ≤ (1 + µ)−TWt + LT σˆ
1 + µ
√
Wt ,
hence,
Wt ≤
(
LT σˆ(1 + µ)T−1
(1 + µ)T − 1
)2
.
This implies in particular that Wt is bounded and we put
W ∗ := lim sup
t→∞
Wt <∞.
For an arbitrary δ > 0 we find t0 sufficiently large such that for all t > t0 − T we have
Wt ≤ W ∗ + δ. Then for t > t0 we obtain from (50) that
Wt ≤ (1 + µ)−T (W ∗ + δ) + LT σˆ
1 + µ
√
W ∗ + δ ,
hence,
W ∗ ≤ (1 + µ)−T (W ∗ + δ) + LT σˆ
1 + µ
√
W ∗ + δ ,
that is,
W ∗ + δ ≤ LT σˆ(1 + µ)
T−1
(1 + µ)T − 1
√
W ∗ + δ +
δ(1 + µ)T
(1 + µ)T − 1 ,
and we conclude that
W ∗ ≤
(
LT σˆ(1 + µ)T−1
(1 + µ)T − 1
)2
+ δ
(1 + µ)T + 1
(1 + µ)T − 1 . (51)
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain that
lim sup
t→∞
Wt ≤
(
LT σˆ(1 + µ)T−1
(1 + µ)T − 1
)2
. (52)
Estimate (52) gives a uniform upper bound for the value of lim supt→∞Wt independent
of the initial condition if the noise terms t, ξt, ηt. In particular, if |ht| ≤ σˆ for all t ∈ N,
then formula (52) holds with T = 1, that is,
lim sup
t→∞
Wt ≤
(
Lσˆ
µ
)2
. (53)
Since by construction (Cxt + Dst)
2 = q2t ≤ 2V 1t ≤ 4W 1t and by definition x∗(st) = κst =
−stD/C, it follows that
lim sup
t→∞
(xt − x∗(st))2 ≤
(
2Lσˆ
µC
)2
. (54)
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Condition (15) of Theorem 3.2 and the definition of ht (see (38)) imply that the estimate
|ht| ≤ σˆ holds with σˆ = L′σ + L′′m, hence (54) implies the first of the estimates (14).
Further, the first equation in (1) implies that
yt − y∗(st) = yt − b1st
b2
=
1− b1
b2
∇tx− ηt
b2
,
hence the second of the estimates (14) follows from the relations C(∇tx)2 ≤ 2V 1t ≤ 4Wt
and (53) combined with σˆ = L′σ + L′′m and (15). This completes the proof of Theorem
3.2.
A few remarks are in order. First, estimate (52) can be useful if system (1) is obtained
as a time discretization of a continuous time system and the increments of noise are of
class `1loc. Second, counterparts of Theorems 3.1–3.2 can be obtained by the same method
if pt is allowed to depend also on yt, for example, if pt = pρ[s0, x+ δy]t with a small δ > 0.
4.3 Stability of the multi-agent model
As mentioned earlier, the proof of Theorem 3.3 is parallel to the proof of Theorem 3.1 but
additionally relies on an inversion formula for the Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator. We start
by deriving the inverse operator.
4.3.1 Inversion of time discrete Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator
The main tool in our analysis is the following identity which, being inspired by the devel-
opments in [30, §34], is essentially due to M. Brokate, see [31, Proposition 2.2.16].
Lemma 4.4 (Brokate identity). Let ρ > 0, σ > 0, β ∈ [−ρ, ρ], γ ∈ [−σ, σ], and x ∈ S be
given. Put p = pρ[β, x], q = pσ[γ, p]. Then q = pρ+σ[β + γ, x]. Moreover, the implication
qt − qt−1 6= 0 =⇒ (pt − pt−1)(qt − qt−1) > 0 (55)
holds for every t ∈ N.
Proof. Put ϕ = pρ+σ[β + γ, x]. We have by definition
(pt − pt−1)(xt − pt − ρz) ≥ 0, (56)
(qt − qt−1)(pt − qt − σz) ≥ 0, (57)
(ϕt − ϕt−1)(xt − ϕt − (ρ+ σ)z) ≥ 0 (58)
for all t ∈ N and all z ∈ [−1, 1]. In (57), we may choose σz = pt−1 − qt−1 and obtain
(qt − qt−1)2 ≤ (qt − qt−1)(pt − pt−1),
and the implication (55) follows. In particular, the inequality (56) remains valid if we
replace pt − pt−1 with qt − qt−1, that is,
(qt − qt−1)(xt − pt − ρz) ≥ 0 (59)
for all t ∈ N and all z ∈ [−1, 1]. Adding (59) to (57) yields
(qt − qt−1)(xt − qt − (ρ+ σ)z) ≥ 0 (60)
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for all t ∈ N and all z ∈ [−1, 1]. We have indeed |xt − qt| ≤ |xt − pt| + |pt − qt| ≤ ρ + σ,
hence we may replace (ρ+ σ)z in (58) with xt− qt, in (60) with xt−ϕt, and sum the two
inequalities to obtain
((qt − ϕt)− (qt−1 − ϕt−1))(qt − ϕt) ≤ 0. (61)
From (61) and (24) for z = q − ϕ it thus follows (qt − ϕt)2 ≤ (q0 − ϕ0)2 for all t ∈ N. We
have ϕ0 = x0 − β − γ, q0 = p0 − γ = x0 − β − γ = ϕ0, and this completes the proof. 
We now recall the definition of a Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator as a linear combination of
play operators. More specifically, let n ∈ N, ν0, . . . , νn ∈ R, 0 = ρ0 < ρ1 < · · · < ρn, and
βi ∈ [−ρi, ρi] be given numbers (in particular, β0 = 0). For x ∈ S and β = (β1, . . . , βn)
we put
F [β, x] =
n∑
i=0
νipρi [βi, x] (62)
with the convention p0[0, x] = x. The mapping F : [−ρ1, ρ1]× · · · × [−ρn, ρn]× S → S is
called a (time and memory discrete) Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator .
Hypothesis 4.5. Let F be a Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator as in (62). The following condi-
tions are assumed to hold:
(i) |βi − βi−1| ≤ ρi − ρi−1 for i = 1, . . . , n;
(ii) Ai :=
∑i
j=0 νj > 0 for i = 0, . . . , n.
We prove the following statement which shows that the inverse of a discrete Prandtl-
Ishlinskii operator is again a Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator. In the continuous case, this result
goes back to [46]. Finite collections of stops have been considered in [47]. A substantially
more general situation in the space of regulated functions is considered in [48]. In fact,
the explicit inversion formula presented below can also be deduced from [48, Corollary
3.3] which uses deeper results from the Kurzweil integration theory. In the discrete case,
there exists an elementary proof that we present here. Note that Lemma 4.2 is a special
case of Theorem 4.6 in the case n = 1.
Theorem 4.6. Let Hypothesis 4.5 hold. Define Bi := 1/Ai and
σ0 = γ0 = 0, σi − σi−1 = Ai−1(ρi − ρi−1), γi − γi−1 = Ai−1(βi − βi−1),
ζ0 := B0, ζi := Bi −Bi−1
for i = 1, . . . , n. For an arbitrary x ∈ S put
v =
n∑
i=0
νipρi [βi, x].
Then,
x =
n∑
i=0
ζipσi [γi, v].
We start with an auxiliary identity.
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Proposition 4.7. Let the hypotheses of Theorem 4.6 hold. For i = 1, . . . , n put
x(i) = pρi−ρi−1 [βi − βi−1, x(i−1)] , v(i) = pσi−σi−1 [γi − γi−1, v(i−1)]
with x(0) = x, v(0) = v. Then for j = 1, . . . , n we have
v(j) = Ajx
(j) +
n∑
i=j+1
νix
(i) .
Proof of Proposition 4.7. The definition of the play states that
(x
(i)
t − x(i)t−1)(x(i−1)t − x(i)t − (ρi − ρi−1)z) ≥ 0 , (63)
(v
(i)
t − v(i)t−1)(v(i−1)t − v(i)t − (σi − σi−1)z) ≥ 0 (64)
for all i = 1, . . . n, t ∈ N, and |z| ≤ 1. For j = 1, . . . , n put
(ϕ
(j)
0 , ϕ
(j)
1 , . . . ) = ϕ
(j) := Ajx
(j) +
n∑
i=j+1
νix
(i) .
Then we have
ϕ(0) = v(0) , ϕ
(i)
t − ϕ(i−1)t = Ai−1(x(i)t − x(i−1)t ) . (65)
Hence, we may choose in (63)–(64) suitable values of z in order to obtain
(x
(i)
t − x(i)t−1)(ϕ(i−1)t − ϕ(i)t − v(i−1)t + v(i)t ) ≥ 0 , (66)
(v
(i)
t − v(i)t−1)(v(i−1)t − v(i)t − ϕ(i−1)t + ϕ(i)t ) ≥ 0 (67)
for i = 1, . . . n and t ∈ N. We now use the implication (55) to conclude that for all
n ≥ j ≥ i ≥ 1 we have
(x
(j)
t − x(j)t−1)(ϕ(i−1)t − ϕ(i)t − v(i−1)t + v(i)t ) ≥ 0 ,
(v
(j)
t − v(j)t−1)(v(i−1)t − v(i)t − ϕ(i−1)t + ϕ(i)t ) ≥ 0.
Summing the above inequalities over i = 1, . . . , j yields (note that ϕ(0) = v(0) by (65))
(x
(j)
t − x(j)t−1)(v(j)t − ϕ(j)t ) ≥ 0, (v(j)t − v(j)t−1)(ϕ(j)t − v(j)t ) ≥ 0 (68)
for j = 1, . . . , n, t ∈ N. In particular, for j = n, we have ϕ(n) = Anx(n). Multiplying the
first inequality of (68) by An and adding the second inequality yields
(ϕ
(n)
t − v(n)t − ϕ(n)t−1 + v(n)t−1)(ϕ(n)t − v(n)t ) ≤ 0
for all t ∈ N. Hence, by (24),
(ϕ
(n)
t − v(n)t )2 ≤ (ϕ(n)0 − v(n)0 )2. (69)
Note that by (65), ϕ
(i)
0 − ϕ(i−1)0 = Ai−1(x(i)0 − x(i−1)0 ) = Ai−1(βi − βi−1) = γi − γi−1 =
v
(i)
0 − v(i−1)0 , hence
ϕ
(i)
0 = v
(i)
0 for i = 0, . . . n , (70)
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and from (69) it follows that
ϕ(n) = v(n) . (71)
We now continue by backward induction and assume that ϕ(j) = v(j) for some 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
From (68) written with j − 1 instead of j we obtain, using the induction hypothesis, that
−(x(j−1)t − x(j−1)t−1 )(v(j)t − ϕ(j)t − v(j−1)t + ϕ(j−1)t ) ≥ 0 , (72)
−(v(j−1)t − v(j−1)t−1 )(ϕ(j)t − v(j)t − ϕ(j−1)t + v(j−1)t ) ≥ 0 . (73)
We now add (73) to (67), multiply the sum of (72) with (66) by Aj−1, use (65), and sum
the two resulting inequalities to conclude that(
(v
(j)
t −ϕ(j)t −v(j−1)t +ϕ(j−1)t )−(v(j)t−1−ϕ(j)t−1−v(j−1)t−1 +ϕ(j−1)t−1 )
)
(v
(j)
t −ϕ(j)t −v(j−1)t +ϕ(j−1)t ) ≤ 0.
This is an inequality of type (24) which, together with the induction assumption ϕ(j) = v(j)
yields
(v
(j−1)
t − ϕ(j−1)t )2 ≤ (v(j−1)t−1 − ϕ(j−1)t−1 )2 . (74)
Referring to (65) and (70) completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let x(i), v(i) be as in Proposition 4.7. By Lemma 4.4 we have
v(i) = pσi [γi, v] for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n. We now use Proposition 4.7 and the summation by
parts formula, which yields
n∑
j=0
ζjv
(i) =
n∑
j=0
ζj
(
Ajx
(j) +
n∑
i=j+1
νix
(i)
)
= x(0) +
n∑
i=1
x(i)(Aiζi + νiBi−1) = x ,
and the proof is complete. 
4.3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We can now use Theorem 4.6 to adapt the proof of Theorem 3.1 to the multi-agent case.
The multi-agent system (18), (21) can still be rewritten as the equation
∇2tx+ A∇tx+B∇ts+ Cxt +Dst = 0 (75)
with positive constants A,B,C,D given by (37) and st as in (20). From the inequalities
(25)–(27) we easily obtain their counterparts
∇tx∇ts = ν0(∇tx)2 +
n∑
i=1
νi∇tx∇ts(i) ≥ ν0(∇tx)2 +
n∑
i=1
νi(∇ts(i))2, (76)
∇2tx∇ts = ν0∇2tx∇tx+
n∑
i=1
νi∇2tx∇ts(i) ≥ ν0∇2tx∇tx+
n∑
i=1
νi∇2t s(i)∇ts(i)
≥ ν0
2
(
(∇tx)2−(∇t−1x)2+(∇2tx)2
)
+
n∑
i=1
νi
2
(
(∇ts(i))2−(∇t−1s(i))2+(∇2t s(i))2
)
, (77)
where we denote s(i) := sρi [βi, x].
18
As in Section 4.2, we define qt by formula (39) and multiply equation (75) by ∇tq. It
follows from (76)–(77) that
∇2tx∇tq = (C+ν0D)∇2tx∇tx+D
n∑
i=1
νi∇2tx∇ts(i) ≥ (C+ν0D)∇2tx∇tx+D
n∑
i=1
νi∇2t s(i)∇ts(i)
≥ C+ν0D
2
(
(∇tx)2−(∇t−1x)2+(∇2tx)2
)
+
n∑
i=1
νiD
2
(
(∇ts(i))2−(∇t−1s(i))2+(∇2t s(i))2
)
and
(A∇tx+B∇ts)∇tq ≥ (AC+ν0(BC+AD))(∇tx)2 +BD(∇ts)2
+ (BC+AD)
n∑
i=1
νi(∇ts(i))2.
Putting
V˜ 1t :=
1
2
(
(C+ν0D)(∇tx)2 +D
n∑
i=1
νi(∇ts(i))2 + q2t
)
,
we obtain (cf. (41) with ht = 0)
V˜ 1t − V˜ 1t−1 +
C+ν0D
2
(∇2tx)2 +
n∑
i=1
νiD
2
(∇2t s(i))2 + (AC+ν0(BC+AD))(∇tx)2
+BD(∇ts)2 + (BC+AD)
n∑
i=1
νi(∇ts(i))2 + 1
2
(∇tq)2 ≤ 0 .
We continue as in Section 4.2 and multiply (75) by qt. Similarly to (43), we obtain
∇tx qt−∇t−1x qt−1 + A
2C
(q2t−q2t−1) +
1
2
q2t ≤ (∇tx−∇2tx)∇tq + E(∇ts)2 −
A
2C
(∇tq)2
≤ F
(
1
2
(∇2tx)2 + (∇tx)2 +
n∑
i=1
νi(∇ts(i))2
)
(78)
with some constants E,F > 0 depending only on A,B,C,D. We set
V˜ 0t := ∇tx qt +
A
2C
q2t
and rewrite (78) in the form
V˜ 0t − V˜ 0t−1 +
1
2
q2t ≤ F
(
1
2
(∇2tx)2 + (∇tx)2 +
n∑
i=1
νi(∇ts(i))2
)
,
which is parallel to (44)–(45). We now define an auxiliary energy functional
W˜t = V˜
1
t + λV˜
0
t
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with λ > 0 such that λV˜ 0t ≥ −12 V˜ 1t and λ < min{C + ν0D,AC+ν0(BC+AD), BC+AD}.
We then find µ > 0 and L > 0 such that for all t ∈ N we have the inequality
W˜t − W˜t−1 + µW˜t ≤ 0.
Therefore, the decay of W˜t is exponential according to the formula
W˜t ≤
(
1
1 + µ
)t
W˜0,
hence also
lim
t→∞
qt = 0 . (79)
Using (20), we can rewrite formula (39) as
qt = (C + ν0D)xt +D
n∑
i=1
νisρi [βi, x]t = (C +D)xt −D
n∑
i=1
νipρi [βi, x]t.
Hence, qt is given by a Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator of the form
qt = ν˜0xt +
n∑
i=1
ν˜ipρi [βi, x]t
with ν˜0 = C+D, ν˜i = −νiD for i = 1, . . . , n. The hypotheses of Theorem 4.6 are satisfied
for
A˜i :=
i∑
j=0
ν˜j ≥ C +D
(
1−
i∑
j=0
νj
)
≥ C > 0.
Consequently, by Theorem 4.6, we have
xt = ζ˜0qt +
n∑
i=1
ζ˜ipσi [γi, q]t
with suitable constants ζ˜i, σi, γi. From (79) and from Lemma 4.3 we conclude that xt
and st are Cauchy sequences that converge to some limits x∞, s∞, respectively, which
completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
5 Conclusions
We have replaced rational expectations about future inflation with a form of bound-
edly rational aggregated ‘sticky’ expectation modeled by the play operator in a simple
standard macroeconomic model. This single (and conceptually quite elementary) change
transforms a unique equilibrium linear system to a PWL system with an entire contin-
uum of equilibrium states. The PWL model with n agents has 2n switching surfaces
and an n-dimensional continuum of equilibria. By constructing a Lyapunov function and
developing a technique for inverting the Prandtl-Ishlinskii operator, we have shown that,
when there is no exogenous noise, the continuum of equilibria is the global attractor of
the system. The size of the basin of attraction of a particular equilibrium varies, generally
becoming smaller towards the boundary of the set of equilibrium states.
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If the presence of stickiness/frictions in economics does indeed induce a myriad of
coexisting (metastable) equilibria then phenomena that are not possible (or require a
posteriori model adjustments) in unique equilibrium models become not just feasible but
inevitable. Perhaps the most obvious of these permanence, also known as remanence,
where a system does not revert to its previous state after an exogenous shock is applied
and then removed. It is of course a central concern of macreconomics whether or not
economies affected by, say, significant negative shocks can be expected to have perma-
nently reduced productivity levels. For the models studied in this paper, after sufficiently
small shocks (whether exogenous or applied by policy makers) the system will indeed
revert to the same equilibrium but larger shocks will move the system from the basin of
attraction of one equilibrium to the basin of attraction of a different one (at the same
model parameters). The path to this new equilibrium may be long with a highly unpre-
dictable endpoint. Furthermore, in the latter case the system will not exhibit a tendency
to return to its pre-shocked state — the model displays true permanence. And the model
parameters alone cannot determine which equilibrium a system is currently in without
knowing important information about the prior states of the system — true path de-
pendence. Hence, the model accounts for several hard-to-explain empirical regularities
observed in economic data. This feature of the model is significant not just because it
corresponds closely to actual economic events but it may have implications for forecasting
and policy prescriptions too.
Our model of expectation formation is thus both mathematically tractable and has
some basis in both observed data (see also [38, 39]) and models of bounded rational-
ity. As such it provides a potentially useful, analytically tractable, alternative to stag-
gered/delayed models — and one with additional complexity and explanatory power. Our
choice of inflation expectations as the candidate for an initial investigation was influenced
by the work of De Grauwe [14] on a different type of boundedly rational expectation forma-
tion process in a simple DSGE model. However, play operators are also a viable candidate
for modeling other sticky economic variables at both the micro- and macro-economic lev-
els. To demonstrate this, we used a play operator to represent sticky responses by the
Central Bank. Although it has not been relevant to this paper play and stop operators,
when combined appropriately [48] can have a remarkably simple aggregated response,
even when connected via a network. This allows for (almost)-analytic solutions even
when cascades and rapid transitions between states are occurring and will be the subject
of future work. The same form of stickiness described above with the associated play
operators have already been used to develop non-equilibrium asset-pricing models [49].
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